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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff, Bcspondcnt,

I

WHI'rl~ ~::·-:-OEL WHITE, \

l!_;VA
her husband,

Case

No.

10832

Defendants, Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the record.
The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in
the trial court.)
STATEMENT OF THJ!J KIND OF CASE
AND DISPOSI'l1ION IN LOWEH COURT
On November 22, 1965, Plaintiff commenced an action
in the District Court of Summit County, State of Utah,
to condemn 17.'.70 acres of the Defendants' lands and im-
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provements situate in Summit County, State of Utah
said lands to be utilized for the purpose of constructing'
a portion of Interstate Highway I-80. (R. 12, 13, and 80)
The authority for the taking was not in dispute and
the sole issue before the Court was a determination of
the amount to be paid Defendants for the lands and improvements taken and the severance damage caused by
such taking.
The case came on for jury trial in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, by order of the court, before the
Honorable A. 11. Ellett, Judge, on the 28th day of November, 19G6, and was concluded on November 29, 1966.
A judgment on the verdict was duly entered awarding
Defondants the sum of $56,000.00 for the lands taken,
$29,000.00 for the improvements taken, and nothing for
severance, for a total award of $85,000.00.
rrl1creafter, Defendants filed a Motion for an Additur, or, in the Alternative, a New Trial which, after hearing, was duly denied. Whereupon this appeal was instituted.

RELIEF' SOUGH'l' ON APPEAL
The Defendant landowners, by this appeal, seek a reversal of the trial court's ruling in denying their Motion
for a N cw Trial, and an Order of this Court granting a
new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 22, 1965, Defendants were the owners
of approximately 201 acres of land located about 17 miles
cast of Salt Lake City, Utah, and one-quarter mile west
of Kimball's Junction along U.S. Highway 40, in Summit
County, State of Utah (It. -1, 12, 26, and 27) (Exhibit
P-1). Said property was divided into two parcels by U.S.
Highway 40 which extended across said lands in a general
northwest-southeast direction (R. 4).
At that time, the Defendants' lands fronted on and
enjoyed unrestrided access to u.S. Highway 40 on both
si<le8 of said highway (Bxhibit P-1, P-2 an<l R 14,
1.J, 18, 27, and 28). 1'he parcel of land located on the
southerly side of the highway had a gradual slope from
the highway to a bench area some 10 to 30 feet higher than
the highway (R. 20). 1'hcre were no jmprovements located upon this parcel of lan<l with the exception of a
gravel pit in one corner near the highway (H. 28). A
portion of said land had been used for raising alfalfa with
the balance remaining in a natural state of wild grass and
sagebrush (R. 28 and 29). After the taking, this particular parcel comprised aLout 95.41 acres (R. 13).
The parcel of land on the northerly side of the highway was approximately lewl with the highway to a depth
of about 600 feet and for a frontage of about 1:.:00 feet
(R. 30 and 73). The remainder of the frontage on the
north side was lower than the highway and sloped down
to a creek, thence easterly from the creek up a hillside (R.
SO and 73). After the taking, this parcel comprised about.
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81.39 acres less 5 acres along the creekbed which Defendants had previously sold to one Robert McComb (R. 13,
34 and Exhibit P-1). Located upon the level portion of
this tract and near the highway "'ere three structures.
One was a building approximately 36 feet by 65 feet comprising 4,040 square feet and utilized for the purpose of
conducting a cafe business and sale of soft drinks and
beer (R. 34, 35). Attached to and forming a part of this
building were modern living quarters consisting of seven
rooms, with one room converted to a walk-in freezer
(R. 38, 45, 120). The portion of this building devoted to
cafe business was constructed in 1947 or 1948 of block
construction with a false cedar siding front (R. 34, 39,
and 43). The walls and ceiling of the cafe were finished
in knotty pine except for a portion back of the bar which
was finished in cherrywood paneling and the overflow
dining room which was plaster finish (R. 38, 39, 132 and
E.xhibits D 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).
A second building was located to the rear of the
cafe building and comprised a 10-unit motel and laundry
room comprising 2491 square feet (Exhibit P-1 and P2,
R. 37, 38, 120 and Exhibits D 6, 7, and 8). Although this
particular building was not located within the area of
the proposed Interstate Highway I-80, it was stipulated
by counsel at the time of trial that the proximity of the
highway was so near the motel, that its value was totally
destroyed and thereforP, the Plaintiff would consider said
motel development as an item to be totally compensated
for in the trial of the case (R. 21, 22, and Exhibit P-1).
'rho motel unit was of cinderblock construction with metal
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roof and knotty pine walls and ceiling finish on the interior. Five units were carpeted and each unit had a
shower, toilet, basin and individual heating (R. 43 and
133). The motel was constructed in 1947 or 1948 (R. 43).
Also on the date of taking, a third building existed
south of the main cafe building which was an old frame
home with a partial cinderblock basement comprising
1,110 square feet (R. 44, 120). The partitions of the
rooms had been removed and the structure was in a poor
condition (R. 31, 45, 46).
The improvements \\'ere serviced by a 268-foot private
water well and a pumping system located beneath the
cafo building, and the sewage was disposed of by septic
tank and leeching fields (R. 40 and 41).
On the date of taking, N overnber 22, 1965, the Defendants were conducting upon the land and premises herein
ref erred to a general cafo and motel business and were
residing upon said lands (R 35, 47, 58). The customers
for said business were derived primarily from the passing
motorists (R. 47).
SubsP(1uent to the taking, and prior to the date of
trial, the Plaintiff entered upon the condemned property
and wrecked the improvements to the extent that the old
residPnce located south of the main cafe building was
totally demolished and remowd and the interiors of the
cafe and motel buildings were gutted and the improvements were otherwise reduced to a state of great disre1iair and delapidation (R. 48, 71, 202-203 and Affidavits
introduced in support of Motion for New Trial).
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On the date of trial, the motel ''ms being used as a
stable for horses and thr interior of the cafe had been
completely gutted.
After the taking, the pro1Jerty will have only limited
access by frontage roads (R. 80, 81, 82, Ex. P-1 and P-2),
the northerly parcel being ~Prviced by an interchange at
Kimball's Junction, one quartt~r mile southeast of the
property and the southerly portion having access by two
interchanges, one at Kimball's Junction and the other at
Parley's Summit, some ± miles west of the parcel of land
(R. 16, 80, 109, 110, Ex. P-1 and P-2).
STATEMENT OF PULX'l'S H-ELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UPON THE GROUNDS
THAT THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING
THE JURY TO VIEW THE IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE
PREMISES.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT
THE JURORS WERE GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT IN VIEW·
ING THE IMPROVEMENTS CONTRARY TO THE ADMONI·
TION OF THE COURT.
ARfl1Tl\1I~NT

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND·
ANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UPON THE GROUNDS
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THAT THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING
THE JURY TO VIEW THE IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE
PREMISES.

78-3-±-11 U.C.A. 1953 fixes the time for detennining
value of the land and the damages "at the date of the
service of the summons." Therefore, N overnber 22, 1965,
becomes the prime and tritiwl elate in the instant case for
determining Defendants' clamagl·s, and the condition of
the premises on that elate is controlling and of significant importante. U ncler ihe eviclente and testimony, we
believe there was no necessity of viewing the premises and
particularly the improvl~rncut;:-; tlu·1·con and that the Court
committed error in permitting the jury to view the same.

Over the objcdion of counsel and at the conclusion of
the testimony and evideucL~, and prior to swmnation or
ddiberation, the 'l'rial Court dircded the jury to be taken
by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County to view the subject
properties (Ii. W2, 203, and 20-±).
It is interesting to note that nowhere in the testimony
was there any substantial tonflict in the description
of the lands, and upon inquiry by the Court, all of the
jurors signified that they had previously seen the property which was the subject of this litigation (R. 202).
Due to such indication, the trial judge commented that
under the circumstances, it probably would not be necessary for the jury to view the premises, however, after further inquiry to detennine how many of the jurors had
previously been inside the cafe building known as "Bill
an<l lj~va's" and an indication that only two of the jurors
hatl been in said building, the judge then concluded that it
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would be proper to allow the jury to view the premises
(R. 202), the Court well knowing that the building at that
time was in a state of great disrepair and could not possibly reflect the condition as of the date of taking. As a
matter of fact, one structure had been removed from the
premises, the interior of the cafe building gutted, and
the motel structure gutted and being used as a horse
stable (R. 48, 71 and affidavits filed in support of Motion
for New Trial).
The improvements were a major item of damage, and
during the trial of the case, the Defendants presented
photographs of the pertinent structures (Exhibits D 3,4,5,
6,7,8,9,10) which were designed to reflect the improvements as of the date of taking. The Plaintiff had an opportunity to preserve and present the same evidence had
it so desired.
There seems little douLt Lut that the weight of authority supports the proposition that a view of the premises in a condemnation action is within the sound discretion of the Court, however, it seems equally well settled
that such discretion must not be abused to the extent of
violating the substantive rights of any of the parties. (See
103 A.L.R. 163.)
rrhe better reasoned cases seem to hold that it constitutes error and an abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge to allow a view where the condition of the
premises has so changed as to no longer reflect the condition of the property on the date of the taking or to be
of any assistance to the jury in its deliberations. One of
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the leading landmark cases on this particular point is the
case of Chioago v. Koff, 341 Ill. 520, 173 N.E. 666. In this
action, a petition was filed to condemn certain property
for the widening of a street. At the time of the hearing,
some 4 years after the petition had been filed, the property had greatly deteriorated owing to inability to lease
it advantageously because of the existence of the widening proceedings and the fact that a receiver had taken
charge under the mortgage.
In holding that under such circumstances it was an
abuse of discretion to allow the jury to view the premises,
the Court there said :

"There is no method by which there may be
preserved in a bill of exceptions the evidence of
the manner in or extent to which the minds of the
various members of the jury were impressed by a
view of the building, and where, as here, such
changes have taken place as to render a view of
no assistance to the jury, for the reason that the
condition at the time of the trial does not reflect
the value as of the time the petition was filed, it is
an abuse of discretion to permit such view. It will
he conceded that a photograph which does not present a true picture of an object as of the time to
which the evidence concerning it relates is not
admissible in evidence except it be with a full explanation of the changes, and we are of the opinion
that in this case the building showed such deterioration that a view of the premises should not have
heen permitted. Such view could scarcely have
bPPn said to be of any assistance to the jury in
understanding the evidence offered concerning
the property."
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Also, in the case of Ajoolian v. Director of Public
\V or ks ( 1950) RI. 155 A :2nd :2-l--~, 77 A.L.R. 2nd 571, the
property in question had materially changed for the worse
between the date the action was cmurncnced and the date
of the hearing, and the Court tlwrP held that it was an
abuse of the Trial Court's discretion to allow a view of the
premises and further held that it was prejudicial to the
land owners' right to a fair hearing.
Of further iuterest, is the ease of United States v.
.U75.:23aacs (1%7, DC NY) l:Jl F. Supp. 590 2nd; U.S.
v. Babinski ( CA:2) 25± F:2ml GS(j, wherein the Court said:
''\Vhil<' a vi('\\' of t]1(• property by the court,
jury, or commission is not now required, it is consid1:~red advisablt>, where possible, and when the
physical charactPrislics of the land and improvements have not so ehanged since the taking as to
impair th<' vahw ol' personal inspection." (Emphasis added) 77 A.L.R. 2d 569.
Of further significance are the cases which have held
that although a view of of the premises is within the
sound discretion of the Court, it does not constitute an
abuse of such discretion where a view is denied because
of changed conditions. In this regard see: Aleverti v.
Walla, Walla., 162 vVash. 487, 298 P. 698, and J. H. Mai
and Leu.a. Mai v. Garden City Kansas, 177 Kan. 179, 277
P2d 636.
In many rases the courts ha Vf> consistently held that
it would constitute prejudicial t>rror to permit a view of
the premises where said properties have been improved
between the date of taking and the trial date, holding that
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a view would not be of any material assistance to the
jury and may unfairly prejudice the jury. In this regard
see: Fitch v. State Highway Commission, 137 Kan. 584,
21 P2d 318.
When we consider the vast differences between the
damages assessed by the appraiser for the Plaintiff: $75432.00 (R. 153), and the damages assessed by appraisers
for the Defendants: $141,500 .. 00 (R. 79), and $152,921.00
(R.123), it seems quite obvious that some distorted factor
entered into the picture to influence the minds of the jury
in assessing the total damages and we submit that a view
of the dilapidated buildings did in fact greatly and materially contribute to the overall penurious award.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT
THE JURORS WERE GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT IN VIEWING THE IMPROVEMENTS CONTRARY TO THE ADMONITION OF THE COURT.

It was pointed out to the Court by counsel for both
parties that the improvements on the premises were dilapidated and in a gutted condition at the time of trial (R.
202, 203), and as borne out by the testimony of various
witnesses (R. 48, 71, 202, 203). Furthermore, counsel for
Defendants objected to a view of the improvements and
advised the Court that such a view would not be of any
assistance to the jury (R. 202, 203).

Under these circumtances, the Court admonished the
jury that they could view the land and the exterior of the
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improvement::>, but that it would be of no help studying
the inside of the buildings ( R 20-:l-). 0 bvi ously, the Court
was aware of the inherPnt dang('r of permitting a view of
the interior of the buildings under the circumstances and
the intrinsic danger of prejudict; developing in the minds
of the jurors, which would be detrimental to the substan.
tive rights of the Defendants.
In the light of this condition and the admonition of
the Court, the jury, \\·hi ch was placed in the custody of the
Sheriff of :::>alt Lake County, was taken to the subject
property and there permitted to view the san1e.

Contrary to the admonition of the trial judge, the
jurors did in fact makl' an insvedion of the improvements '
in their dilapidated condition, wl1id1 included a detailed
inspection of the interior of the structures. (Affidavits
filed in support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial).
This conduct ou the part of the jury was not discovered until after the trial had been concluded and the
verdict rendered due to the fact that the jury was taken
to view the premises without the judge or counsel being
in attendance.
rro what extent such unauthorized view influenced
the minds of the jurors we cannot say, but certainly the
substantive rights of thP DPfrndant landowners were
jeopardized. llad the Court intC>nded such a view of the
interior, it would have hel:'n necesimry to establish a more
complete and detailed foundation, and for the same reason
that a photograph is not admissible in evidence without
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1

first establishing an adequate foundation, a view of the
improvements was error.
In the absence of such a proper foundation, the danger is ever present of the attention of the jury being
invited to portions and conditions of the premises not
properly before it for consideration.

The actions and conduct of the jurors in viewing the
premises has of necessity been established by the affidavits secured by both Plaintiff and Defendants in support of and in opposition to the .Motion filed by Defendant landowners for a new trial of the case. It is of interest to note that the affidavits procured by the Plaintiff
and filed in opposition to Defendants' Motion for New
Trial, corroborated the affidavits submitted by the Defendant landowners to the effect that the jurors did in
fact make an inspection of the interior of the improvements located upon the land contrary to the court's admonition.
The Utal1 Supreme Court in the case of White v.
Pease, ct al., 15 Utali 170, 49 P. 41G, and the case of
Wright v. U.P. R.R. Co., 22 Utah 338, G2 P. 317, has
recognized the principal that affidavits of jurors may be
reviewed on appeal if properly preserved in the record
by inclusion of said affidavits as part of the Motion for
New Trial.
The general rule, it is true, is to the effect that jurors
may not by affidavit impeach their verdict, which principal of law seems well founded, however, this rule seems
primarily designed to protect the sanctity of jury deliber-
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ations and conduct within the jury room. The conduct of
the jury complained of here' was such that others could
have observed it if present and therefore does not violate
the sanctity of the jurors' deliberations. Furthermore '
'
the conduct complained of occurred prior to the sub.
mission of the case to the jury.
1

In the case of City uf Miami v .Frances Bopp, 158
So. 89 and as cited in 97 A.L.R. 1035, the Court there discussing the use of affidavits said:

''It is true, as a general rule, on the ground of
public policy, that the affidavit, deposition, or
statement of a juror will not be received to impeach his own verdict; but this court has heretofore recognized excc1Jtions to that rule, and espe- ,
cially thu.t exception which is generally recognized
by the courts of this country.
In Linsley v. State, 88 Fla. 135, 101 So. 273, 275, we
said:
"It is upon grounds of p1tblic policy that the '
rule is obsrrved that the affidavit, deposition, or
statement of a juror will not be received to irnpeach his own verdict; but this rule relates to 1
matters resting in the personal consciousness of
the juror, as said by llf r. Justice Brewer in Perry
v. Bailry, 12 Kan. 539. When a juror is heard to 1
impeach his own verdict because of some matter
restinq in his own consciousness, the power is
gii·en ·to him to nullify the rxpressed conclusions
under oa·th of himsrlf and eleven others. 'The
general rule is that affidavits of jurors are admis1
sible to explain and uphold their verdict, but not
to impeach and overthrow it. But this ~ene~al
rule is subject to this qualification, that affidavits
of jurors may be received, for the purpose of
1
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avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring
during the trial or in the jury room which does
not essentially inhere in the verdwt itself.'
"The rule announced in the Kansas case seems
to us to be a salutary one and more consistent with
reason and sound policy. That rule, as announced
by Mr. Justice Brewer, is that all those matters
lying outside the personal consciousness of the individu<il juror, those things which are matters of
sight and hearing, and therefore accessible to the
testimony of others and subject to contradWtion;
the interests of justice will be promoted and no
sound public policy disturbed, if the secrecy of the
jury box is not permitted to be the safe cover for
the pepctration of wr.ongs upon parties litigant.
If the jury has been t,111ilty of no misconduct, no
harm has been done by permitting their testimony
to be received. If the jury has been guilty of misconduct, but such misconduct was not of such a
nature as to prejudice the rights of the parties,
the verdict should stand, but the offending juror
should be punished. But if such misconduct has
wrought prejudice, not only should the juror be
punished, but the verdict should also be set aside;
but matters resting in the personal consciousness
of one juror should not be received to overthrow
the verdict, because, being personal, it is not accessible to other testimony." (Emphasis added.)

It is stated in 53 Am. J ur. 772, Section 1109 as follows:
"The rule that the testimony of jurors will not
be received to impeach their verdict is subject in
many jurisdictions to a recognized exception that
affidavits of jurors may be received to show matters occurring <luring the trial not essentially inhering in the verdict, that is, not falling within or
pertaining to the legitimate ssues in the case.
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Thus, there is authority for the view that while
the testimony of jurors cannot be received to show
matters which essentially inhere in their ver.dict,
they may testify as to facts occurring within their
own personal observation in such a maniner that
others as well as themselves would be cognizant
of them and could testify as to them." (Emphasis
added.)
Of similar interest is the case of State v. McCormick,
57 Kan. 440, 46 P. 777 where the Court there said:
"~While the testimony of jurors cannot be receiveJ. to show matters which essentially inhere
in their verdict, they nwy testify to facts which
transpired within their own personal observation,
and which transpired in sitch a manner that others,
as well as themselves, would be cognizamt of them,
and could testify to them."

The Comi ther(' eiting OottlcilJ v. Jasper, 27 Kan. 770;
Ra·ilroad Co. v. Bayes, 42 Kan. 609, 22 Pac. 741.
Another case which seems in point is the case of
Merrell v. City of Stillwater as cited in 249 P2d 715. In
this case, the Plaintiff was claiming damages to two basements and the rrrial Court ordered the jurors to view the
premisC's. When it was discovered that the jurors made
an inspection of only one of the basements, the Plaintiff
property owner filed a .Motion for New Trial, supported
by affidavits showing the misconduct on the part of the
jury, which Motion was deniPd by the trial judge. In reversing the Trial Court and holding that the misconduct
of the jury was error justifying a new trial, the Court
there said:
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"When the trial court invoked the above statute and ordered the jury to view the premises, it
became its mandatory duty to examine each basement which was alleged to have been damaged by
the negligent acts of the city. The jury had no
right to inspect a portion of the premises to the
exclusion of the other, and its conduct in so doing
violated the legal rights of the Plaintiff. The
orderly administration of justice demands that a
jury scrupulously observe and follow the instructions of the court. To hold otherwise would be
tantamount to condoning the act of a jury in ignoring any given instruction of a trial court. Suppose
in this case that the jury, after being ordered by
the court to view the premises, had failed to examine any part of the property. Could it be argued that such disregard of the court's instruction would be countenanced or that a new trial
should not be granted~ w·e think not. It logically
follows that the trial court erred in overruling the
motion of the Plaintiff for a new trial."
In the case of Harrod v. Sanders, 137 Okl. 231, 278
Pac. 1102, the Trial Court instructed the jury to view certain offices of the Defendant. While in the process of
such viewing, one of the jurors became separated and
only 11 members of the jury viewed the premises. In
granting a new trial, the Supreme Court there held that
the failure of the jury to view the premises in a body was
such misconduct that the rights of the Defendants were
presumed to be prejudiced. In said case the Court stated:

"It has been held that, 'where some of the
jurors make an unauthorized view, the irregularity is not cured by direction of the court to the
entire jury to make a view, and that, where the
act of a juror was in direct disobedience to a ruling
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refusing to allow a view, no inquiry will be made
as to whetlwr or not prejudice to a party resulted,
but the verdict will Le set aside on the broad
ground that the misconduet of the juror has a
tendency to corrupt and cast suspicion on the administration of justice.' 4 C. J. 954; Heline vs.
Kingston, 8 Kulp (Pa.) 221."
"The holding in the case of Helme vs. Kingston, above, we think is founded upon common
sense and sound reason, and is in harmony with
the proper administration of justice, and should
be the rule in this state."
The Court further considering the matter of permitting the use of affidavits of jurors to show misconduct
cited with approval and as authority for such use the
case of M., 0.G. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 55 Okla. 12, 155 P. 233,
where the Court held:
"The general rule is that affidavits of jurors
are admissihle to t•xplain and uphold their verdict,
but not to impeach and overthrow it. But this general rule is subject to this qualification: The affidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose
of avoiding a verdict to show any matter occurring
during the trial, or in the jury room, which does
not essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that
the jury considered and were influenced by specific evidence that had not been offered or admitted at the trial; but such evidence is not admissible
to show any matter which essentially inheres in
the verdict, as that the juror did not assent to the
verdict, that he misunderstood the instructions, or
any other matter resting alone in the juror's
breast."
There can be no doubt but that the unauthorized view
was tantamount to the admission of improper evidence.
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Furthermore, the affidavits do not conclusively show that
all of the jurors participated in the unauthorized view.
Consequently, we are not certain, under the circumstances,
that all of the jurors had the same evidence before them
at the time of their deliberations.
Can it be said under these circumstances that the
rights of the Defendant landowners were not jeopardized
or prejudiced~ We think not.
It being the duty of the Court to safeguard the rights
of the parties to a fair trial, we respectfully submit that
the :Motion for New Trial should have been granted.

CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's genuine concern regarding a view of
the premises, we believe, is reflected in the admonition to
the jury when the Court stated "the jurors will understand
that the property has been . . . on the inside has been
changed and altered, suit would be uf nu help to be studying the inside of it. • ':• *" ~Che Court thus recognized the
inherent danger of prejudice developing. rrhe improvements constituting a major part of the damages then
became an item of vital interest to Le considered by the
jury only under the most scru1mlous an<l specified conditions so as to reflect their condition on the date of taking.
It is well known and understood Ly all, that impressions
acquired by sight frequently carry a greater impact than
a thousand words and to quote a favorite expression of
the trial judge in the instant case: "You can take the fly
out of the soup but you can't remove the flavor."
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Considering the fact that Uw State of Utah was the
responsible party for permitting the premises to be reduced to a shambles and in the dila1Jidatcd condition at
the time of trial, we feel that an extra duty was owed to
assure a fair presentation of the evidence in this regard,
and under all the cin:umsta11ce:::;, believe that it was as
prejudicial and unfair to allow the view as it would have
been to allow a view if the pro1Jerty had been greatly improved at the time of trial. ln other words, neither party
should be allowed to "guild the lilly."
The conduct of the jury is not in dispute as evidenced
by the affidavits filed by both parties in support of and
in opposition to the Motion for N cw r_rrial. The use of
such affidavits to show sud1 comluct we believe is supported by the better reasoned cases and is in harmony
with the pri11ciplcs of fair and complete justice. To permit
or condone the jury's conduct in totally disregarding the
admonition of the Court cannot be supported under any
guise or rule of law.
L~nder the circumstances, we feel the substantive
rights of the Defendant landowners were violated and
that the only appropriate redress is a new trial of the
case.

Respectfully sub111ith•d,

BRANrr H. WALL
Attorney for DefendantsA]JJJCllants
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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